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Abstract
Reporters covering the Middle East are often confronted with situations where information 
is notoriously hard to verify and where confrontations with witnesses’ harsh realities can be 
extraordinarily intense. How does one deal with claims that there are no chemical weapons 
in Syria, for instance, if no foreign visitors are allowed to enter the neighbourhoods where the 
attacks allegedly took place? And how far does one go in adopting or contextualizing the story 
of a crying little girl blaming ‘terrorists’ for destroying her life if you are taken to her by a 
regime official, who considers every form of opposition an act of terror? Under such conditions, 
reporters can hardly rely upon seemingly self-evident routines, nor can they simply revert to 
general values such as impartiality or bearing witness without much further ado. Instead, they 
find themselves forced to make judgements on particular situations time and time again. Based 
on 14 in-depth interviews with Dutch and Flemish reporters covering Syria, this article sets out 
to identify, first, the challenging situations with which these journalists have been confronted, and 
second, how they have responded to these challenges through the use of particular professional 
strategies. To explore these challenges and strategies, the article develops a theoretical and 
methodological approach centred around situated value judgements. 
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Introduction
Reporters covering the Middle East are often confronted with situations where informa-
tion is notoriously hard to verify, and where confrontations with witnesses’ harsh reali-
ties can be extraordinarily intense. How does one deal with claims that there are no 
chemical weapons in Syria, for instance, if no foreign visitors are allowed to enter the 
neighbourhoods where the attacks allegedly took place? And how far does one go in 
adopting or contextualizing the story of a crying little girl blaming ‘terrorists’ for 
destroying her life if you are taken to her by a regime official, who considers every form 
of opposition an act of terror? Under such conditions, reporters can hardly rely upon 
seemingly self-evident routines, nor can they simply revert to general values such as 
impartiality or bearing witness without much further ado. Instead, they find themselves 
forced to make judgements on particular situations time and time again. While this is 
arguably the case for any journalist, irrespective of the topic or place he or she reports 
upon, covering the Middle East seems to drive these challenges to a rather extreme 
form. It is in these concrete situations, then, that more abstract values acquire their 
practical meaning.
More than a decade ago, these challenges attracted a great deal of scholarly atten-
tion due to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (Allan and Zelizer, 2004a; Thussu and 
Freedman, 2003; Tumber and Palmer, 2004). This interest resurfaced more recently in 
the wake of the 2011 uprisings, leading scholars to explore a wide range of fascinating 
new topics, such as the role of social media in spreading user generated content 
(Andén-Papadopoulos and Pantti, 2013a; Harb, 2011), or the rise of citizen journalism 
(Howard and Hussain, 2013; Khamis and Vaughn, 2011). This wide interest in social 
and citizen media still leaves many questions unanswered one of the more pertinent 
amongst which is how mainstream journalists continue their struggle to cope with 
the immense difficulties in covering these new conflicts. This article, then, draws on 
the particular case of Dutch and Flemish reporters to provide at least some answers to 
the following two questions: first, what are the challenges encountered by journalists 
covering Syria, and how do they respond to these? And, second, how do these journal-
ists practically apply more general values through a series of particular judgements on 
actually emerging situations?
Studying journalistic practices through situations
Understanding how these challenges are experienced and responded to by journalists 
requires at least a minimal awareness of the cultural constructions guiding their prac-
tices. In this vein, the last few decades have seen a rising scholarly interest in journalistic 
cultures and values. The merits of these studies are undisputed as they allow, for instance, 
to distinguish between different (national) journalistic cultures (Hallin and Mancini, 2004; 
Hanitzsch, 2012) to deepen our understanding of journalists’ values and role conceptions 
(Boudana, 2010; Pantti, 2010; Zhang, 2013), to trace longitudinal changes in these con-
ceptions (Deuze, 2005; Wu and Hamilton, 2004) as well as in their practices (Archetti, 
2013; Hamilton and Jenner, 2004) and to relate these to demographic, educational and 
organizational characteristics (Hess, 1996; Weaver and Willnat, 2012). Nevertheless, 
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their methodological design provides us with primarily indirect links to how journalists 
deal with challenges in actually emerging situations as they tend to incite self-reflexive 
responses on abstract value conceptions and general role orientations. In other words, 
while this strand of the literature produces a great deal of information on what values are, 
and to which structural variables they relate, they tell us less about how these values 
work in practice, and how they translate into judgements on particular situations. What 
does it mean, for instance, to endorse a watchdog role if you have little more than unreli-
able rumours to pit against a more powerful actor? And under what conditions do jour-
nalists who are generally oriented more towards an impartial rather than an engaged role 
revert to more subjectivist, emotion-driven reporting styles?
Presumably the best way to explore these situated judgements is by conducting long-
term ethnographies on how news is made (Bird, 2010; Cottle, 2007; Hannerz, 2004). 
One of the obvious difficulties in studying war journalism, however, is gaining access to 
the field – at least without running extreme risks or increasing those run by your respond-
ents. This helps to explain why so few ethnographic studies of war correspondents exist 
(Pedelty, 1995), apart from the surrogate of (former) journalists’ autobiographical 
accounts.1 To tackle these barriers, this article therefore explores the merit of a different 
theoretical and methodological approach, designed to bring these situated judgements to 
the fore.
In On Justification (2006), Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot devote considerable 
attention to ambivalent ‘situations’, in which actors encounter a number of subjects or 
objects that can be interpreted along the lines of different ‘regimes’ (e.g. market-driven 
efficiency or loyalty to traditional family structures). In contrast to more self-evident, 
routine interpretations and actions, these ambivalent situations require a particular judge-
ment and possibly a more extensive process of deliberation and discussion. The main 
advantage of focusing primarily on these situations is that it allows us to draw more 
attention to how actors deal with the structural ambivalences emerging from the incom-
patible logic of particular ‘regimes’, fields or systems. As such, situations serve as hot 
spots where more general values (e.g. verification, impartiality, watchdog role, engage-
ment) are applied and realized in a more practical context. For our purposes, further-
more, identifying and describing these situations promises to be a relevant endeavour in 
and by itself as the situations mainstream journalists encounter in Syria have received 
only scant scholarly attention (Salama, 2012).
More precisely, a situation can thus be understood as a configuration of elements 
(whether they are human subjects or material objects) providing a challenge to journal-
ists by requiring them to make a judgement on how the situation should be interpreted 
and acted upon. When journalists are brought by the current regime to a group of expres-
sively mourning women whose men have been allegedly killed by rebel forces, they are 
forced to make a particular judgement on precisely what it means to maintain an ‘objec-
tive, impartial’ stance, or how far they can go in relating these women’s emotions as a 
‘subjective reality’ to their political context. All the elements that are present in such a 
situation thus need to be taken into account (e.g. by whom and why were they taken to 
these women? What role did journalists’ own emotional response play in deciding how 
to cover this story?).
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Strategies, then, are the practices journalists revert to in order to endorse particular 
values (e.g. showing different perspectives, places and peoples of a single topic) in chal-
lenging conditions (e.g. physical access is available to only one of the actors involved). 
To effectuate these values in their professional practice, journalists or their editors cover-
ing Syria thus had to revert to particular and sometimes creative ‘strategies’, some of 
which were new to the actors involved. Even though journalists seemed ‘forced’ to revert 
to particular practices in response to difficult situations, what interests us here is the 
variety and divergences between these responses. In a wider sense, these strategies can 
thus be related to a struggle to maintain and protect the autonomy of journalists from 
external pressure on their work (e.g. by some of the actors involved in the war) (Hannerz, 
2004; Schudson and Anderson, 2009).
More generally, however, Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) are interested in the justifi-
cation processes with which actors decide on how to interpret and act upon a myriad of 
situations. Their primary objective is to map the total sum of arguments that are logically 
available to actors. In doing so, they rely theoretically upon six strands of political phi-
losophy (e.g. on the merit of ‘competition’ for society at large) and, empirically, upon 
handbooks and manuals (e.g. on how to make one’s organization more competitive). In 
this article, by contrast, the main emphasis lies not so much on the cognitive–discursive 
justification processes incited by such situations, but rather on the ‘situated judgements’ 
and ‘practices’ as such. This means, more precisely, that attention is drawn less to how 
journalists ‘justify’ taking a particular decision vis-à-vis their colleagues or editors, and 
more on what it is that makes them decide to act and interpret things in a particular way. 
The reason for taking this approach is that it enables us to focus more on the role of 
unconscious processes impacting on these judgements (e.g. editorial policies to which 
journalists are bound, or the role played by intense emotions), instead of over concentrat-
ing on the verbal arguments that are logically available to the actors involved (Benatouil, 
1999). To sum up, the article proceeds by first identifying these challenging situations 
that are characteristic for covering Syria before exploring how reporters have dealt with 
them through a series of particular judgements.
Method
Methodologically, this article builds on in-depth interviews that were designed specifi-
cally to identify and explore concrete situations and the judgements they required. More 
concretely, the interviews were preceded and informed by a preparatory study of the 
participating journalists’ news stories, thereby mapping the general outlook of all their 
stories on Syria (which topics they dealt with most often, such as the refugee crisis, geo-
politics or military evolvements) as well as providing an in-depth, qualitative analysis of 
up to 30 of their reports. While the results of this preparatory study will be discussed in 
fuller detail in a separate article, the main goal of the qualitative analysis for this article 
was to identify differences in reporting (e.g. phenomenological approaches), the narra-
tives that were used (e.g. stories of universal suffering), news subjects and their voices 
(e.g. people who were interviewed or sites that were visited), and the vocabularies that 
were used (e.g. referring to the Syrian government or the Syrian regime). This served two 
goals: first, to provide us with leads on their different reporting practices and selection 
310 Media, War & Conflict 9(3)
strategies. And second, this allowed me to develop interview questions on specific 
reports as opposed to general questions on value and role conceptions, or their overall 
practices. By designing questions in this manner, I sought to obtain as much information 
as possible on the situations they encountered and how they judged these situations 
accordingly. Typically recurring questions thus included: How did this report come to 
be? Where did the idea come from? Who was involved? What was the role of editors, 
fixers and your personal network in this particular story? What tools (e.g. camera, voice 
recorder, social media, wires) did you use? What obstacles or difficulties occurred and 
how did you deal with them? Have you come across similar obstacles without being able 
to tackle them? After talking to several people on the scene, how did you finally select 
the stories included in your report?
Obviously, such an approach still has some major shortcomings as it ultimately 
remains based on journalists’ own (reflexive) account of their past practices, rather than 
the practices themselves (Archetti, 2014; Bourdieu, 1977; Hannerz, 2004). However, the 
main goal was not to study direct practices – as opposed to discourses – but rather to 
focus on empirical situations in which judgements were made – as opposed to the ten-
dency of interviews to incite conscious reflections on abstract values and norms 
(Boltanski and Thèvenot, 2006; Lamont, 1991; in the case of journalism, see Boudana, 
2010; Pantti, 2010). Hence questions were not asked in the predominant scholarly form 
(e.g. ‘What place do emotions have in your own work?’), but in a way that was tailored 
to actually occurring situations (e.g. ‘How did this particular emotional report come into 
being, and how did you experience that?’). While such an account is still inevitably 
plagued by journalists’ tendency to defend and in some cases even idealize their prac-
tices, it should nevertheless enable us to explore more precisely how norms and values 
are enacted in particular situations.
More concretely, this study is based on in-depth interviews with 14 Dutch and Flemish 
reporters who made reports on the Syrian conflict and its refugees in the neighbouring 
countries. Of the interviews, 9 were conducted face-to-face, and 5 were carried out 
through Skype. All but 3 of the participants were male. While attempts were made to 
include all reporters from the Dutch-speaking area who travelled to Syria, approximately 
two thirds of this group effectively participated in the research. Participating journalists 
were employed by a variety of media, including flagship news programmes and current 
affairs on public service and commercial broadcasters, permanent correspondents and 
freelancers working for print and alternative media. This group thus includes reporters 
who had done plenty of shorter, factual reports, as well as freelancers and specialized 
parachutists who had ventured into the conflict a bit deeper. This variety should enable 
me to identify a wider range of practices and situations, and to explore, in a forthcoming 
study, how divergences between these journalists’ strategies can be explained. However, 
as some of the issues discussed are of a rather sensitive nature – given the insecure condi-
tions of journalists working in and around Syria (Reporters Without Borders, 2013) – the 
names, gender and affiliations of the participating journalists are anonymized.
All interviews lasted between one and two hours, and were carried out in July 2014, 
with the exception of two early interviews carried out in February, and one late interview 
carried out in October of the same year. Hence, the situations and cases discussed here 
refer to their reporting practices in the period beginning with the Syrian uprisings in 
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March 2011, until all but three interviews that were carried out in July 2014. At that 
point, the so-called Islamic State was only slowly beginning to rise and had not con-
quered such a large and coherent piece of land as it has done ever since the fall and winter 
of 2014, nor were there any foreign interventions lurking on the horizon. At the time that 
the interviews were carried out, the conflict had taken a decisively sectarian and geopo-
litical turn in global media coverage, while the refugee crisis had consolidated with an 
estimated 6.5 million Syrians fleeing their homes and 1.5 million having crossed the 
border to seek shelter in neighbouring countries.
Situations and strategies
Situation: Restricted physical access
One of the most elementary ways in which political actors in the Middle East attempt 
to steer media coverage is by restricting journalists’ access to parts of their territories. 
While much has been written on the sophisticated press releases, linguistic subtleties 
and forceful images designed to lead journalists in a particular direction (Tumber and 
Webster, 2006; Wolfsfeld, 1997), it is these ultimately physical barriers that prevent 
even the most critical of journalists to ‘see for themselves’ what is going on, or to 
include diverging perspectives by ‘talking to the locals’. In Syria, more specifically, 
the problem was that journalists could enter the country either through the official 
channels by successfully applying for a government-approved visa, or through rebel-
held areas. Journalists who entered rebel-held areas without permission from the 
Syrian government were from then on considered to be collaborators and would no 
longer be granted an official visa. Far from being an isolated case, one reporter 
remarked that ‘one of the cardinal sins you can commit, in the eyes of the Syrian gov-
ernment, was going into a rebel-held area, illegally as they see it’ (original emphasis). 
It should be noted that the Syrian regime has at its disposal a notoriously ubiquitous 
and professional body of secret agents, the so-called Mukharabat, assisted by the 
‘Ministry for Information’. According to the reporters participating in this research, 
both organizations are substantially more professional than, say, Egypt’s or Iraq’s 
intelligence services ever were. This became evident when the Syrian intelligence ser-
vices tracked down the remaining foreign journalists on its territory in the first few 
months after the start of the uprisings – in a period when absolutely no foreign media 
were allowed into the country. Three of the reporters I talked to were living in Syria at 
the time, and were either denied access when trying to return to the country, or were 
arrested and evicted for ‘illegal practices’ – compare this to Egypt’s rather clumsy 
response of taking journalists to court.
On the other hand, journalists who had first entered the country by means of an offi-
cial visa in some cases faced scepticism and distrust from rebel groups when trying to 
enter the country under their guidance. This attitude can be partly explained by the 
Syrian state television’s creative use of foreign journalists’ work. Three broadcast jour-
nalists, for instance, claimed to be aware that their images had been used at least at one 
point by the Syrian state broadcaster’s main news channels, albeit with voice-overs 
added to their images. In addition to their work being used for propaganda purposes, 
312 Media, War & Conflict 9(3)
this proved worrying for journalists’ physical safety as they had to rely on either side of 
the parties for their trust and protection.
Strategies
Some media organizations responded to these physical barriers by working out a divi-
sion of labour among their journalists. At least two public service news or current affairs 
programmes thus had one journalist entering Syria now and then through the official 
channels, whereas the other occasionally entered rebel-held areas. In both cases, the 
idea for this set-up emerged rather organically, that is, without being consciously 
planned in advance. This policy simply resulted from one of the journalists being unable 
to acquire an official visa after entering rebel-held areas, which led the editors to decide 
that, from then on, the other journalist would enter the country only through the official 
channels. Syrian intelligence services thus seemed to exclude individual journalists, 
rather than media organizations – something that can be recognized with the BBC’s 
Paul Wood and Lyse Doucet. Presumably, the intelligence services saw no reason to 
exclude journalists covering Syria from the good side of the land: at least in theory, their 
coverage would still be influenced.
By opting for this division of labour, the editors seemed to put high value on covering 
a broader range of perspectives, places and peoples – a problem that was often criticized 
by media scholars working on the Iraq war (Boyd-Barrett, 2004; Couldry and Downey, 
2004). More concretely, the labour division established for these two programmes was 
designed to ensure a long-term presence in the region, allowing them to produce news 
reports and analyses rather frequently as both journalists developed more sustainable 
contacts and networks within rebel groups and the Syrian state, respectively. As scholars 
have noted, these trust relations are especially crucial to war correspondents as they 
negotiate their autonomy through informal as much as through formal relations (Hannerz, 
2004; Murrell, 2009; Palmer and Fontan, 2007).
In spite of its practical advantages, however, this strategy led to the professional frus-
tration of the individual journalists involved, who felt prevented from acquiring a fuller 
perspective. As one of them recalled:
For me, that’s very annoying from a journalistic point of view. It’s the same for [my colleague], 
he can only produce stories on the opposition. I think it would be really healthy for both of us 
if I could go to East-Aleppo, and he could go to Damascus.
In other words, it was precisely by sacrificing individual journalists’ multiperspectival-
ity, that the news programmes as a whole were able to cover a wider variety of perspec-
tives, peoples and places. By doing so, the editors hoped to circumvent the problem other 
newsrooms ran by having only one specialized Middle East journalist, who would be 
more easily prone to residing with one side only.
These individual journalists, in turn, developed an altogether different strategy, by 
first visiting Syria through an official visa before entering areas held by a range of oppo-
sitional groups, including secular, fundamentalist and Kurdish rebels on different occa-
sions. Even though this way of proceeding prevented them from gaining access through 
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the official channels afterwards, it did enable them to cover the different aspects and 
actors of the conflict at least once. This strategy was particularly deployed by parachute 
journalists, who were, at the time of their first visits, more often than not unaware of the 
implications caused by entering the country through rebel groups. Again, this way of 
dealing with the situation emerged organically rather than reflexively: it was the nature 
of the situation and their past acts that led them to act in this way. As in the case of the 
news programmes organizing a labour division between their Middle East specialists, 
these journalists sought to maintain the ideal of presenting a plurality of perspectives. 
The main difference with these individual reporters, however, is that their response to the 
situation was not designed for frequent reports and analyses, but rather for occasional, 
more subjective stories deepening the reports made by desk journalists. As a result, the 
labour-division taking place here was between specialized parachute reporters and their 
desk-based colleagues.
The implications of this type of response were twofold. On the one hand, these para-
chutists were relatively satisfied with their work as it covered what they considered to be 
the most important actors of the war: the official regime, Islamic fundamentalists and the 
more secular rebel groups. As one of them explained: ‘I feel pretty confident that I have, 
in my own little way of doing fieldwork, tried and explored the three different routes’, 
adding that he felt he didn’t have ‘anything to add’ to the news coverage of the conflict 
at the time. As far as he was concerned, other wars and conflicts across the globe deserved 
as much attention as the one in Syria. On the other hand, however, the news programmes 
these journalists worked for became more reliant upon desk-based reporting through 
press releases, video footage, NGO reports and analyses by colleagues working in the 
region. In short, by having one reporter showing different sides of the conflict, these 
news programmes inevitably exposed themselves to less readily verifiable sources.
Print journalists resorting to a much safer approach used Skype to interview people of 
different political persuasions on either side of the border, as Skype has long been con-
sidered one of the safest communication means for rebels and activists in the Middle East 
(Andén-Papadopoulos and Pantti, 2013b). Even though this approach did provide jour-
nalists with access to particular individuals, it also left them with little means to verify 
and control the accuracy of their accounts. Furthermore, Syrians’ general caution of 
intelligence agents emerging in the most unexpected of disguises also meant that they 
were often reluctant to identify themselves or substantiate their claims with concrete 
names and places. Journalists responded to this situation in two general ways, both of 
which were designed to control for the comparably low reliability of their mediated wit-
nesses. Some relied on a very wide, more superficial network of individuals they could 
reach through colleagues, fixers and friends. They would use these networks (through 
telephone and social media) to do background checks on the persons they interviewed 
and the stories they told. They made their judgement by taking into account a wide range 
of opinions and interpretations, which would allow them to assess the perils and caveats 
of any particular statement. Other reporters used an apparently opposite type of strategy, 
as they claimed to rely on Skype interviews only for interviewing individuals they had 
known personally for quite some time. This precautionary measure lead them not so 
much to trust what their interviewees said, but rather to estimate their background and 
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affiliations by themselves so that this could at least be taken into consideration. While 
these reporters of course also possessed a wide personal network, they would thus use 
more in-depth relations to deal with the uncertainty inherent in mediated interviews.
More exceptionally, some of the print journalists were able to keep their options open 
by reporting anonymously from rebel-held or besieged areas. This response was availa-
ble only to those who had lived in Syria for a longer period of time, which meant they 
could rely on the support of comparably elaborate personal networks. Even though 
abductions were relatively rare at the time, reporting anonymously remained highly dan-
gerous, not only due to the ongoing violence but mainly because of the threats their 
beloved ones would receive from the intelligence services, even to the point of physical 
intimidation. While the services were careful enough not to harm them – as journalists 
they retained the power to spread their witness to the world – the message to leave the 
country was communicated clearly enough. Lastly, it should be noted that this strategy 
was generally limited to the first 6 months after the start of the uprisings in March 2011: 
it thus took the intelligence services less than half a year to expel at least all Dutch-
speaking journalists from its territory.
Situation: Being embedded
Once journalists had acquired an official visa, they still had to deal with the ‘minders’ 
sent along by the ‘Ministry of Information’. While officially serving to ‘guide and pro-
tect’ as fixers normally do, these government employees made reports on journalists’ 
precise whereabouts and activities, whilst leading them to places that were ‘safe’ both for 
the journalist and for the Syrian government. In a particular case, one reporter visiting 
Damascus was repeatedly refused entrance to a public park and a public school where 
refugees had settled, both by his minder and by locals apparently coincidentally hanging 
out on the corners of the park. Furthermore, these minders were known to deliberately 
mistranslate interviewees’ stories, and sometimes even force the latter into giving the 
right answers through verbal and on some occasions even unabashedly physical intimi-
dation. In one case, a reporter recalled noticing a group of men approaching behind him 
as he was talking to a man who had found shelter in a public school that was now gov-
erned by the Syrian army. Within one sentence, the man swiftly changed the term ‘forces 
of resistance’ to ‘terrorists’.
Of course, rebel groups were equally keen to show journalists their version of the 
facts, whether they were secular groups de-emphasizing the role played by sectarian 
motives in the conflict, or extremists claiming precisely the opposite. In one particularly 
striking case, it turned out that some of the female Kurdish fighters who had been widely 
covered in the international media, were set-up precisely to reframe the media coverage 
and to attract more sympathy from the West. In two cases, journalists had encountered at 
least one group of ‘staged’ women fighters before finding one that truly participated in 
the YPG, the Kurdish People Protection Units. The story of independent, emancipated 
women was thought – rightfully so, as it turned out – to draw the attention of the secular 
West, as it provided an interesting side-story to the orientalist stereotype of head-scarfed 
women repressed by their men.
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Strategies
All the journalists entering the country through official visas devoted considerable atten-
tion to minders’ efforts to prevent independent coverage. In one case, a reporter who had 
been given permission to report from Damascus set out to produce a news story on, first, 
the Yarmouk refugee camp – which was at the time rumoured to be starved to death by 
the Syrian forces; second, to persons taking refuge in a public school controlled by gov-
ernment staff; and third, to refugees gathered in a public park. While none of these 
attempts were granted by the accompanying minders, in the case of the public park some 
‘locals’ intervened as well, saying that there was nothing to be seen, and that it would not 
be safe for journalists to go there. Subsequently, the topic of the news story did not focus 
on the refugees’ fate, but rather on the obstacles thrown up to prevent journalists from 
reaching them. In addition, some journalists produced additional side-reports on ‘how 
the news was made’. Two broadcast reporters, for instance, published ‘behind the scenes’ 
footage on social media, whereas one journalist provided his alternative medium with a 
text on the relevance of fixers and unreliable local contacts. As these journalists found 
themselves in situations where the limitations of reporting the more or less transparent 
representation of facts became all too obvious, they thus reacted by shifting their atten-
tion towards the representation itself, as it formed part and parcel of the conflict they 
were covering.
This strategy can be related to some of the criticisms of the standard of ‘objectivity’ 
(Deuze, 2005; Hallin, 1992; Stoker, 1995) – and, accordingly, to some of the criticisms 
raised in the coverage of the Iraq war (Tumber and Palmer, 2004). As Boudana (2010) 
noted, the French war correspondents in her study generally rejected the notion of ‘objec-
tivity’, conceived of as a form of neutrality, in favour of values such as ‘honesty’ and 
‘modesty’. As their working conditions often did not allow them to verify or double-
check the facts which was needed to take the position of an omniscient reporter towering 
above the earthly turmoil of their news subjects, they felt it more useful to revert to val-
ues of honesty and modesty, meaning that one needs to be fair enough to report simply 
what you have seen, and to communicate on the limits of your particular point of view.
However, while these strategies were quite visibly present in journalists’ reports on 
the Syrian regime, they seemed to be much less articulated in reports that were made by 
journalists embedded with rebel groups. This is at least partly due to the professional, 
more openly systematic manner in which Syrian government-minders were preventing 
journalists from talking to particular people or visiting specific sites. While the fact that 
they were being ‘embedded’ with rebel groups was openly announced by journalists at 
the beginning of their reports, the consequences thereof were only mentioned in terms of 
their willingness to tell us their story, or to show us which homes had been destroyed or 
which bodies had been killed by the Syrian regime. Overall, journalists did not explicitly 
thematize rebel groups’ attempts to prevent them from seeing particular sites or persons. 
In this sense, I do not recall any reporter, either written or broadcast, publicly communi-
cating the staged nature of some of the female Kurdish fighters – even though two jour-
nalists noted their awareness of this practice in the interviews.
In addition, some of the journalists I spoke to claimed to have made use of a more 
intricate strategy to bypass some of the constraints posed by being embedded, as they 
316 Media, War & Conflict 9(3)
developed confidential relations with particular minders. In Syria, as in other Middle 
East states, some minders would allow journalists to move about more freely than others, 
albeit within certain limits. Thus, if a reporter succeeded in developing a more friendly 
relationship with some minders, the latter might desist at least from physically intimidat-
ing the subjects the reporter was trying to interview. While such relationships clearly did 
not provide journalists with all the freedom they desired, it did seem to give them a little 
bit of breathing space, enabling them to estimate the context of their environment slightly 
better. Especially to well-known visitors, the Ministry of Information also allowed a little 
bit of leeway in moving about: two reporters even said they had filed complaints with the 
Ministry on minders who had not sufficiently allowed them to do their work properly, 
after which they were assigned other minders on their next visits.
Together, the impediments I have described thus far fed into the more general prob-
lem of providing evidence for the claims journalists made in their reports. In other 
words, the accuracy of the information they disseminated was often hard to verify and 
generally impossible to double-check. In response to these difficulties, some journalists 
felt confident enough to interpret rumours and statements in their own manner, in a way 
reminiscent of Tuchman’s (1972) editor, who explained that ‘analysis’ served as a name 
for news reports that could not be boiled down to verified empirical facts. These jour-
nalists felt able to estimate both the likeliness of unverified information, as well as 
actors’ true intentions, thereby situating them within the more general course of affairs. 
This form of guaranteeing the accuracy of news reports, however, was based on journal-
ists’ wider knowledge of the conflict, the region and his or her capacities for drawing 
the right conclusions out of vague and disconnected bits of information (Hannerz, 
2004). These insights were thus only accessible to either long-term permanent corre-
spondents in the region, or to strongly specialized parachutists (e.g. in Middle East 
conflicts), whereas generalist parachutists or freelancers would revert to, respectively, 
the verifiable facts irrespective of their low informational value, or to the subjectivist 
approaches described below.
These subjectivist approaches often entailed what has been characterized as more 
‘phenomenological methods’ (Kester, 2010; Murrell, 2009, 2010) or ‘naturalist’ tech-
niques (Graddol, 1994), that is, limiting oneself to a detailed description of what one 
sees, senses, smells or hears. These descriptions then serve as a ‘proof’ only of how real-
ity was at a certain point of time in a certain place, instead of telling their audience of the 
general state of affairs, from the perspective of an omniscient, objective spectator. Rather 
than being driven by a shift in general journalistic ideals (Deuze, 2005; Hallin, 1992), 
these methods seemed to spring from the difficult situations they faced in Syria, as a full-
blown form of objectivity seemed to be out of reach. These techniques thus served to 
cover at least a modest piece of reality truthfully. One reporter, for instance, was allowed 
to visit parts of a besieged town that had just been recaptured by the Syrian army. While 
the scene and its people were real enough, they were also arranged in the sense that jour-
nalists were presumably meant to report on the misery of people returning to their 
destroyed homes and neighbourhoods for the first time in several years, and to link their 
misery to what the regime considered to be its main perpetrator: the rebel forces. The 
journalist responded to the situation by writing down simply what he saw, as part of the 
reality he encountered. That is, by deliberately not including the structural–political 
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context of the scene, he sought to escape from a form of partial, biased news coverage in 
favour of the regime. Hence the story he told was one of the experience of war, rather 
than its politics.
Furthermore, this method was put to use by some journalists in a rather ingenious 
way: some of these phenomenologically described stories functioned as a complement to 
a news event that had been verified by experts or authoritative media. In one particular 
case, a reporter set out to visit neighbourhoods where chemical weapons had been 
deployed to explore what the impact had been, how the locals had experienced those 
attacks, and what they thought about the international commotion it had caused. By 
focusing on the particular topic of chemical weapons, the reporter was thus able to 
develop his story on the facts gathered by international weapon experts and NGOs on the 
ground. The double-checking of facts and information had thus been done elsewhere. In 
a variant on the same reporting technique, a reporter visiting the Zaattari refugee camp 
in Jordan focused in detail on one particular family’s story, precisely because their story 
could be linked to already verified information on the refugee flow of their group (com-
ing from a particular area and minority in Syria). While the accuracy of their particular 
subjective story could thus not be verified, the availability of more general information 
nevertheless provided it with a grounding that was deemed sufficiently reasonable.
Situation: Physical risks and dangers
The physical risks and dangers journalists face when entering a war zone are a different 
but well-known type of practical impediment for doing their work properly (Tumber, 
2009). Besides the general violence inherent to the frontline, this also includes exposure 
to singular terrorist attacks, as well as abductions – which have become a widespread 
phenomenon in Syria, as they did in neighbouring Iraq a decade before (Reporters 
Without Borders, 2013). No matter through which channels they entered Syria, journal-
ists always put their lives in the hands of the groups they were embedded with. In this 
sense, the protection one might have expected from the Syrian government when travel-
ling with official visa and security staff, did not always live up to its expectations. One 
of the reporters had survived a surprise terrorist attack on a convoy of foreign journalists 
in which one of his colleagues was killed. The precise timing of the attack led the surviv-
ing journalists to suspect the Syrian government itself to be responsible, even though 
they were never able to substantiate those suspicions. Perhaps even more than in previ-
ous Middle East conflicts, the war in Syria has seen journalists themselves become the 
subject of deliberate attacks and abductions, rather than part of the mere accidental casu-
alties inherent to any warfare.
Strategies
Compared to their allegedly better equipped colleagues at the BBC and CNN, the Dutch 
and Flemish reporters had no security staff at their disposal. Instead, their local fixers 
served as security agents by guiding them to safe places and by helping them to pass 
borders and rebel-held checkpoints. The judgement these journalists made, in other 
words, was to seek to maintain their safety not through physical protection, but rather 
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through strengthening their local ties, relying on native speakers and fixers who would 
lead them away from hazard in the first place. While this judgement seemed to be incited 
by their comparably smaller financial capabilities – as they simply could not afford to 
hire more specialized security staff – it seemed to enable them to slightly change the situ-
ation to their advantage, by putting higher stakes on sustainable relations with fixers. The 
downside of this strategy, however, was that it increased journalists’ dependency on fix-
ers in providing access to news stories, as had been briefly but was becoming increas-
ingly documented by scholars (Murrell, 2009, 2010; Palmer and Fontan, 2007). In line 
with the findings from these scholars’ work, the journalists I interviewed tried to tackle 
this issue by using only those fixers who had been recommended by at least one of their 
(inter)national colleagues or, in other cases, by relying on Dutch or Flemish fixers who 
had been living in the region for quite some time.
And yet, in the Syrian case, this situation of dependency seemed even more compli-
cated compared to the one faced by journalists in Iraq a decade before. Not only is access 
to ‘ordinary people’ limited by the fixer’s own network and identity in spite of his or her 
best intentions, as Palmer and Fontan (2007) remarked, but in Syria all fixers are them-
selves strongly dependent upon their network within particular rebel groups. In other 
words: there are no ‘ordinary Syrians’ left out of the civil war: the only way to access 
them is not through an unconsciously biased fixer, but through the increasingly profes-
sional communication staff working for particular movements involved in the conflict 
themselves.
Situation: Emotional and moral intensity
Besides these practical challenges to journalistic autonomy, reporters covering the Middle 
East quite regularly find themselves in extraordinarily intense and morally ambivalent 
situations (Allan and Zelizer, 2004b). More often than their colleagues working at home 
or as foreign correspondents in liberal democracies, they encounter horrific scenes of 
human suffering, interviewing men and women who have lost just about everything – 
their house, their family, their freedom. Rather than posing a clear-cut challenge to imple-
menting journalistic principles, these intense situations force journalists to reinterpret the 
key values underlying their work (Frosh and Pinchevski, 2009; Silverstone, 2007). How 
much room should they provide, in such dramatic encounters, for emotional accounts and 
gruesome images? Should such suffering be linked to political responsibilities and struc-
tural causes, even if you are brought to these victims by one of the actors involved?
Strategies: Critical distance and subjectivist engagement
The literatures on distant suffering and media ethics have widely recognized two broad 
stances towards situations such as these (Chouliaraki, 2008; Pantti, 2010; Silverstone, 
2007). One type of response entails a more objective, ‘realist’ perspective in which jour-
nalists attempt to maintain their critical distance. The other advocates a more subjective, 
‘naturalist’ approach allowing more room for personal experiences and emotional narra-
tives. Both types of responses comprise a wider range of more concrete strategies to deal 
with these morally or emotionally intense situations.
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The more objectivist approach is characterized first and foremost by the relatively 
marginal and succinct inclusion of emotional experiences. In such an account, the 
emphasis lies more on, for instance, the verified facts. In one case, a reporter who was 
shown dozens of corpses piled up in a mosque felt reluctant to cover it in detail because 
he had not been there when any of the action had happened and he could not provide any 
reliable information as to the identity of the bodies nor of the event’s perpetrators. His 
sense was that he needed to stick to the facts of the situation, whatever they may be, and 
they were simply not clear enough for him to go into detail on the corpses themselves. 
Thus, in this case, the inability to verify the factual context provided by the locals led him 
to give it no central, visual place in his report. In a slightly different vein, one reporter 
decided to include the heavily tortured man who had shown him his wounds, yet without 
concentrating on the visual image of the wound, but rather putting his story in the broader 
context of the politics, interests and tactics that caused the victim’s suffering. Instead of 
what he described as ‘indulging the audience’ in the gruesome picture, this reporter chose 
to use that man’s story as an exemplifying vehicle to discuss the political impasse as two 
sides blamed each other for their atrocities.
Interestingly, reporters who tended towards this objectivist stance would allow more 
intense emotional accounts on the apparent condition that they fitted into more estab-
lished, conventional story lines, such as a visit to the Zaattari refugee camp. More pre-
cisely, they seemed to be reluctant to include more intense stories and images unless they 
involved pure, de-politicized victims, such as young children. This selective openness 
towards more emotional accounts can be understood from a more strict interpretation of 
professional norms and values: in order for an emotional account to be made into a story, 
it had to fit within one of the established journalistic formats or ‘story lines’ (Hannerz, 
2004) allowing such an exceptional leniency.
Perhaps more characteristic of the objectivist, professional stance is the way some 
journalists dealt with relationships of trust. Reporting on Syria includes generally sensi-
tive topics, requiring a great deal of mutual trust between journalists and their interview-
ees, even more so when there are cameras, microphones and security staff involved. To 
develop these trust relationships, journalists and/or their fixers need to invest in long, 
personal talks and elaborate conversations on seemingly irrelevant topics. When the 
interview is finished and the story is sent to the editors, journalists generally have very 
little time left to maintain or deepen much of these personal interactions as new stories 
are waiting to be reported. Hence, this involvement at least potentially throws up ques-
tions of how a journalist maintains a balance between developing these personal rela-
tions through mutual respect and empathy, on the one hand, and keeping a professional 
distance, on the other. Arguably, both are needed to deliver a good story within ethically 
desirable boundaries yet, due to the central role of (emotional and moral) empathy in 
such situations, journalists are bound to position themselves differently along the con-
tinuum of engagement and difference.
In one case, a dispute arose between two reporters travelling to a small village in 
Lebanon. A few months earlier, one of them had interviewed a man diagnosed with can-
cer and the reporter wanted to make some time available to stop in his particular village 
and ask around how this man had been in the meantime. Whereas that reporter felt 
obliged to do this after taking credit for the ill man’s story, the other one considered such 
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a stop to be both a waste of time and an inappropriately personal way of behaving. Even 
though it should be noted that the latter did express his concerns for the subjects pre-
sented in his stories, he seemed to endorse a more minimal account of good journalism’s 
ethical boundaries. While not returning to the village of the ill man was denounced as 
something immoral by the more engaged journalist, the same response was defended by 
his colleague as a matter of mature professionalism.
In general, the more engaged stance entailed the use of phenomenological methods, 
in which emotions and subjective experiences were considered to be part of an objective 
reality (Pantti, 2010). Of crucial importance here is the fact that these decisions to do so 
were often taken by listening carefully to one’s own emotions. In one particular case, 
when a reporter and his colleagues visited the Zaattari refugee camp, a little girl col-
lapsed into inconsolable hysteria, right in front of the recording camera, after being told 
that her favourite toy had been left at home. One of the difficulties emerging from this 
situation was whether or not this emotional footage should be given a central place in 
the wider report or not. The journalists and editors involved thus had to make a judge-
ment on the precise place of emotion, context and facts within the small limit of time 
that was available to this particular story. At the moment this happened, most of the 
production crew either burst into tears or walked away from the tent to prevent them 
from doing so. The decision was then taken collectively, I was told, to use the footage 
not only as a dominant part of the story, but also to briefly show the journalist himself 
as openly displaying his empathy. The rationale behind that move was that the team’s 
emotional reaction reflected the broader reality of the refugee camp and its approxi-
mately 200,000 children, which it could then bring closer to the audience watching the 
news in western Europe. In a similar vein, another reporter’s decision to build his story 
around a tall man whimpering over the remnants of his home was taken only after he 
had heard the shivering in his own voice as he interviewed the man, when listening to 
his recorder on the way home.
Another type of strategy was included in the same story but returned time and again 
among the journalists I interviewed. By focusing on ‘ordinary people’s suffering’, they 
sought to universalize the ‘human condition’ of war. Thus, by putting the crying refugee 
child or the whimpering tall man into the heart of the story, they maintained a central 
emphasis on the emotional experience without necessarily taking (political) sides. The 
emotional register of these reports thus consisted of an empathic stance, as distinct from 
a form of indignation that stems from particular people’s suffering caused by specific 
perpetrators (Boltanski, 1999). Such reports emerged primarily in the early period of the 
Syrian uprisings, where journalists often took sides with ‘the public’ and their suffering 
inflicted by the regime, and resurfaced with the repeated chemical weapons attack at the 
end of August 2013.
Concluding remarks
This article set out to provide some tentative answers to two questions. First, it sought to 
explore and present the challenges encountered by reporters covering the Syrian conflict 
and the strategies they developed in response to them. Second, how do reporters apply 
more general values through a series of particular judgements on actually emerging 
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situations? The most important weakness of this descriptive design, as I see it, is that it 
lacks convincing explanatory power for the strategies that are being used. Instead of ask-
ing which journalistic values are predominant among Middle East reporters, this article 
concentrated on what it means to endorse specific values in real-life, ambivalent situa-
tions. To address the first, rather than the second question, requires an altogether differ-
ent type of analysis which could well take a Bourdieusian, New Institutional (Benson, 
2006; Dickinson, 2008; Vandevoordt, 2015) or profession-based perspective (Schudson, 
2003). Such analyses would enable scholars to draw more systematic connections 
between these strategies and more structural factors, such as the degree of individual 
journalists’ education and their previous employments, as well as the position of the 
organization they work for within the (national) media landscape.
Nevertheless, by describing how these situations and strategies work, a number of 
valuable results came to the fore. First, several forms of subjective, phenomenological 
strategies emerged here as a response to objective values that no longer seemed to fit 
with the actually occurring situation. In covering Syria, these strategies seemed primarily 
useful precisely to maintain an acceptable form of journalistic ‘honesty’ (Boudana, 2010) 
in spite of having difficult access to a variety of places, peoples and perspectives. In 
some cases, reporters endorsed these phenomenological methods more or less perti-
nently, as they had specialized in covering conflicts such as these. In other cases, how-
ever, reporters who were generally oriented more towards objectivist values reverted to 
these methods more through formats that seemed ‘safe’ or ‘conventional’, such as 
Christmas reports on a family living in a refugee camp. In other words, the situational 
approach allowed us to move beyond the ideal-typical divide of subjective and objective 
reporting styles (Deuze, 2005 Hallin, 1992), and to improve our understanding of the 
precise and shifting context in which they acquire their meaning.
Second, we saw the relevance of universalizing human suffering as a guiding ration-
ale for subjective engagement, as opposed to more politically oriented forms of engage-
ment, such as indignation or advocacy (Boltanski, 1999; Chouliaraki, 2013). This 
particular strategy allowed journalists to engage morally and emotionally with the sub-
jects they reported on, without immediately politicizing their condition. What is new or 
valuable to this insight is that this rather well-known form of de-contextualization 
(Chouliaraki, 2008) seemed to be incited by a situation where reporters felt they were 
being manipulated by either the Syrian state or rebel groups, in order to draw attention to 
the fate of their enemies’ victims. It was thus in response to these external attempts to 
influence journalists’ practices that de-contextualization appeared as a strategy to remain 
loyal to the more central values of naturalism (showing reality as it is) and impartiality 
(not explicitly taking sides).
Third, the editorial context influenced not so much which values were deemed cru-
cial as how they were interpreted more practically. For instance, the ideal of multiper-
spectivalism was applied differently on the level of the individual (in the case of fewer 
specialists and less frequent reports) than on the level of the newsroom (in the case of 
employing more specialists, more frequent reporting). An additional example appeared 
with those journalists who were not able to afford specialized security staff, which led 
them to rely on local fixers for their safety and guidance, as a way of putting a difficult 
situation to their favour without having too many resources at their disposal. Fourth, 
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difficult conditions in terms of access and physical danger meant that journalists became 
even more dependent upon fixers and minders, as they did in previous conflicts (Murrell, 
2009). Developing sustainable, confidential relationships of trust was a common 
response to this situation (Palmer and Fanton, 2007). A different, sometimes comple-
mentary strategy consisted of developing a wider network of more superficial contacts, 
to estimate and situate individual statements (Hannerz, 2004).
To conclude, however, it seems useful to note that this situation-strategic approach 
can and should be developed more elaborately in the future. In this article, the main 
focus was directed to the general nature of the situations with which journalists cover-
ing Syria were confronted and the range of strategies they developed to cope with them. 
However, such an approach can also be developed further by analysing the process of 
these situations and their responses in much more detail, thereby drawing attention to 
the precise elements involved in every phase of the production process (e.g. voice 
recorders, types of cameras, which fixers they relied on and why, choosing which sto-
ries to select out of the witnesses one encounters). Such a more fine-grained analysis, 
however, would also imply limiting the number of situations to be discussed to two or 
three. As it stands, analysing how Syria is being covered therefore remains a task wide 
open to future inquiries.
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Note
1. One of the accounts that comes closest to a social-scientific study of journalistic practices 
is Joris Luyendijk’s Hello Everybody (2010). While it surely helps that Luyendijk studied 
anthropology before becoming a Middle East correspondent, it should be taken into account 
that his book was written as a polemic rather than as a full-flown academic treatise.
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